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LINGUISTIC COLONIALISM: LAW, INDEPENDENCE, AND 
LANGUAGE RIGHTS IN PUERTO RICO 
by ANDREA FREEMAN* 
INTRODUCTION 
In March 2008, after a two-year grand jury investigation, the federal 
government indicted then-governor of Puerto Rico, Aruba! S. Acevedo Vila, leader 
of the pro-Commonwealth Popular Democratic Party (PDP), on nineteen counts of 
campaign finance fraud. 1 Members of the pro-statehood New Progressive Party 
(NPP) clamored for Acevedo Vila's impeachment. 2 Attempting to imbue the 
subsequent proceedings with the appearance of neutrality, the court brought in 
United States District of New Hampshire Judge Paul Barbadoro to try the case. On 
an island where over eighty percent of the population votes in gubernatorial 
elections, it would be virtually impossible to find a jury of indiyiduals without 
strong ties to either the PDP or the NPP. 3 Nonetheless, Judge Barbadoro 
preemptively announced that he would deny all motions for a change of venue and 
declared his intention to brook few delays in the commencement of the trial. His 
statements satisfied the public's desire for a speedy resolution of the drama that had 
been brewing on the island for many months, 4 but in the federal courthouse, they 
mandated immediate attention to a serious problem. 
At the time of Barbadoro's announcement, the entire federal jury pool for the 
District of Puerto Rico numbered fewer than five hundred people5 out of the 
island's four million inhabitants. 6 Due to the English-language requirement for 
•Teaching Fellow, California Western School of Law, San Diego, afreeman@cwsl.edu. Many thanks 
to Luis Fuentes-Rohwer at Indiana University Maurer School of Law, Steven Macias at the University 
of Oregon School of Law and to my colleagues at California Western, Ruben Garcia, Tom Barton, and 
William Aceves, for their insightful comments on earlier drafts of this essay. I am also indebted to my 
friends and colleagues in Puerto Rico, particularly Jorge Sierra, Gerardo Vasquez, Ryan Lozar, Jose 
Antonio Fuste, and Sarah Spiegel. 
I. Kirk Semple, U.S. Issues Indictment of Governor in Puerto Rico, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 2008, at 
Al6. 
2. Id. 
3. See Anibal S. Acevedo Vila, N.Y. TIMES, http://topics.nytimes.com/topics/reference/timestopics 
/people/a/anibal_s_acevedo_vila/index.html (last updated Mar. 24, 2009) ("Governor's races are always 
impassioned in Puerto Rico, where a mind-boggling 80-plus percent of voters turn out on Election 
Day."). 
4. See David Johnston, Puerto Rico's Governor, Under Inquiry, Sees Politics, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2, 
2007, at A24 (quoting Acevedo Vila's statement that the investigation had already been ongoing for two 
and a half years). 
5. Interview with Jose Antonio Fuste, Chief Judge, D.P.R. (March 2008). 
6. Puerto Rican Population, UNITED STATES CENSUS 2010, http://2010.census.gov/mediacenter/po 
rtrait-of-america/puerto-rican-population.php (last visited Nov. 12, 2010). 
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jurors, 7 this pool was smaller than ones from which courts often draw to create a 
jury for only one controversial case. Not only was the pool impossibly small, it was 
also highly imbalanced, consisting almost entirely of the island's elite: a group of 
financially secure, educated individuals, many of whom had studied in the United 
States. 8 In short, the jury pool did not represent a cross section of the community, 
as required by the Sixth Amendment9 and federal law. 10 
The district court faced another language-rights challenge preceding the 
November 2008 election, in which Acevedo Vila still intended to run, in spite of 
his pending trial. 11 A group of minority English-speakers, eager to participate in 
this controversial election, moved the court to order Puerto Rico's election 
committee to print ballots in English and Spanish for the first time. 12 Granting this 
request, the district court invoked the Voting Rights Act, a statute that, read 
literally, bestows no rights on minority English-speakers. 13 The law was not written 
to accommodate this group whose existence legislators failed to anticipate. The 
court also ordered bilingual ballots based on the Equal Protection clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. 14 To support this aspect of the decision, the court labeled 
"natives of the continental United States" a racial minority based on the association 
between English and national origin in Puerto Rico. 15 
Analysis of the deprivation of Sixth Amendment rights in Puerto Rico and the 
absurdity of applying the Voting Rights Act to an English minority or creating a 
racial category of continental Americans reveals the injustice inherent in Puerto 
Rico's current status. After exploring the tension between federal and constitutional 
7. 28 u.s.c. § 1865(b)(2)-(3) (2006). 
8. Cf Jose Julian Alvarez Gonzalez, Law, Language, and Statehood: The Role of English in the 
Great State of Puerto Rico, in FOREIGN IN A DOMESTIC SENSE: PUERTO RICO, AMERICAN EXPANSION, 
AND THE CONSTITUTION 289, 290 (Christina Duffy Burnett & Burke Marshall eds., 2001) (stating that 
fluency in English reflects socioeconomic class). 
9. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; see Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 526-27 (1975) ("Both in the 
course of exercising its supervisory powers over trials in federal courts and in the constitutional context, 
the Court has unambiguously declared that the American concept of a jury trial contemplates a jury 
drawn from a/air cross section of the community.") (emphasis added). 
10. 28 U.S.C. § 1861 ("It is the policy of the United States that all litigants in Federal courts entitled 
to trial by jury shall have the right to grand and petit juries selected at random from a fair cross section 
of the community in the district or division wherein the court convenes."). 
11. John Marino, Embattled Puerto Rico Governor Seeks Re-election, REUTERS (Apr. 7, 2008, 5:08 
PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSN2743592420080427 (last visited Nov. 12, 2010). 
12. Diffenderfer v. G6mez-Col6n, 587 F. Supp. 2d 338, 341 (D.P.R. 2008), vacated, 587 F.3d 445 
(I st Cir. 2009), a.ff' g corrected order on reconsideration, 606 F. Supp. 2d 222 (2009). 
13. Diffenderfer, 587 F. Supp. 2d at 343 ("Because we find that the Spanish-only ballots violate the 
Voting Rights Act ... we grant the injunctive reliefrequested .... "); 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(f)(2) (2010) 
("No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure shall be imposed 
or applied by any State or political subdivision to deny or abridge the right of any citizen of the United 
States to vote because he is a member of a language minority group."). 
14. Diffenderfer, 587 F. Supp. 2d at 343. The relief requested included an injunction requiring 
Puerto Rico to print bilingual Spanish- and English-language ballots for the 2008 elections. Id. at 340. 
15. Id. at 347 ("While groups of people who share a linguistic background do not always correspond 
to any definite racial or ethnic group, this case implicates the electoral rights of English speakers in a 
predominantly Spanish-speaking jurisdiction. Jn Puerto Rico, use of English is frequently identified with 
natives of the continental United States, as a distinct national category apart from native-born Puerto 
Ricans, for whom Spanish remains their mother tongue.") (citations omitted). 
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law and the linguistic reality of Puerto Rico, this Essay will therefore call for a 
dramatic change in Puerto Rico's relationship with the United States to prevent 
further contradictions and inequities. 
Part I reviews and analyzes courts' attempts to reconcile the conflict between 
the statutory English-language requirement for federal jurors, 16 Puerto Rico's 
almost entirely Spanish-speaking population, and the Sixth Amendment's 
constitutional mandate. This part consists of three sub-parts: a description of Puerto 
Rico's linguistic landscape in comparison with that of the United States, a history 
of fair cross section challenges pertaining to the District of Puerto Rico, and a 
comparative look at fair cross section 17 challenges in the Ninth Circuit. Part II 
examines the tension between language and constitutional rights through the lens of 
one case, Diffenderfer v. G6mez-Co/6n. 18 In this challenge to the policies of Puerto 
Rico's election commission, the district court relied on the Voting Rights Act, the 
Equal Protection clause, and the First Amendment to order the printing of bilingual 
ballots for the 2008 gubernatorial election. 19 In light of the legal gymnastics and 
concessions required to reach the courts' holdings on both of these matters, this 
Essay concludes that the state of linguistic colonialism presently existing between 
the United States and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico is legally and morally 
untenable. 
I. THE ENGLISH-LANGUAGE REQUIREMENT AND THE SIXTH 
AMENDMENT 
To qualify for jury service in a federal district court, a person must be able to 
speak English and to read, write, and understand it "with a degree of proficiency 
sufficient to fill out satisfactorily the juror qualification form." 20 Both the United 
States Constitution, under the Sixth Amendment, and federal law, under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1861, require federal jury pools to re present a cross section of the community in 
which judicial proceedings occur. 21 Nonetheless, courts have consistently rejected 
challenges to the English-language requirement as it applies to the District of 
Puerto Rico, where the requirement excludes approximately eighty percent of the 
district's population from federal jury service and renders the remaining pool 
relatively homogenous with regard to class and education levels. 22 Although the 
16. 28 u .s.c. § l 865(b )(2)-(3). 
17. See 28 U.S.C. § 1861 (2006) ("It is the policy of the United States that all litigants in Federal 
courts entitled to trial by jury shall have the right to grand and petit juries selected at random from a fair 
cross section of the community in the district or division wherein the court convenes.") 
18. 587 F. Supp. 2d 338. 
19. Id. at 343. 
20. 28 U.S.C. § !865{b)(2)-(3). 
21. See 28 U.S.C. § 1861 ("It is the policy of the United States that all litigants in Federal courts 
entitled to trial by jury shall have the right to grand and petit juries selected at random from a fair cross 
section of the community in the district or division wherein the court convenes."); U.S. CONST. amend. 
VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an 
impartial jury of the state and district wherein the crime shall have been committed .... "). The statutory 
and constitutional analyses are the same. United States v. Grisham, 63 F.3d 1074, I 077 (I Ith Cir. 2007). 
22. See, e.g., Miranda v. United States, 255 F.2d 9, 16 (!st Cir. 1958) (rejecting a challenge to the 
English-language requirement stating that it is "reasonable and indeed necessary to the proper 
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First Circuit's response to this question is consistent with outcomes reached in 
other circuits facing fair cross section challenges, 23 marked cultural and linguistic 
differences likely render this symmetry irrelevant to the correctness of the First 
Circuit's analysis. 
In other federal judicial districts, most notably in the Ninth Circuit, defendants 
have failed to establish a prima facie case of unconstitutional underrepresentation 
based on a comparison of the percentage of Spanish speakers, or "'Hispanics,"' on 
a jury and the number of jury-eligible Hispanics in the community. 24 The law has 
developed with a narrow focus on whether the proper point of comparison is the 
whole or the jury-eligible population, without reaching the issues of whether 
underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion, and, if so, whether significant 
national interests balance out the harm of that exclusion. 25 In contrast, cases arising 
in Puerto Rico, an island almost entirely populated by Spanish speakers, have 
focused entirely on whether significant national interests justify the conceded 
exclusion of the majority of the population from jury service. 
Part I begins with a description of Puerto Rico's linguistic landscape as well as 
the statistics and court rules relevant to an inquiry into the effect of the English-
language requirement. It then reviews the most significant First Circuit and District 
of Puerto Rico cases analyzing and establishing the constitutionality of the English-
language requirement in the face of fair cross section challenges. Next, it traces the 
development of fair cross section law in the Ninth Circuit where, due to the high 
functioning of the court as a member of the federal judicial system"); United States v. Benmuhar, 658 
F.2d 14, 20 (1st Cir. I981) (holding that the national-language interest encompassed in the English 
proficiency requirement is significant and did not deny defendant his Sixth Amendment right to a 
representative jury), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1117 (1982); United States v. Aponte-Suarez, 905 F.2d 483, 
492 (1st Cir. 1990) (asserting "the overwhelming national interest served by the use of English in a 
United States court justifies conducting proceedings in the District of Puerto Rico in English and 
requiring jurors to be proficient in that language.") (citation omitted), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 990 (1990); 
United States v. Gonzalez-Velez, 466 F.3d 27, 40 (!st Cir. 2006) (citing its own ruling in finding jurors 
must be proficient in English and denying defendant's claim for violation of his Sixth Amendment 
rights). Although there are currently no statistics demonstrating this assertion, one scholar believes that 
Puerto Ricans eligible for jury service are also racially homogeneous. See Jasmine Gonzales Rose, 
Language Rights In Puerto Rico, HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. (forthcoming 2011). 
23. See, e.g., United States v. Torres-Hernandez, 447 F.3d 699, 702 n.l (9th Cir. 2006) (noting that 
to be ''.jury eligible" one must, among other things, be able to speak English (citing 28 U.S.C. § 
l 865(b )(! )-(3))). 
24. See, e.g., id. at 705-06 ("[A] 2.0 percentage point absolute disparity between the percentage of 
jury-eligible Hispanics and the percentage of Hispanics on [the defendant's] grand jury venire was 
constitutionally insignificant). 
25. See, e.g., id at 701. "A district court need not and may not take into account Hispanics who are 
ineligible for jury service to determine whether Hispanics are underrepresented on grand jury venires. 
To establish a prima facie violation of the Sixth Amendment's guarantee that grand juries reflect a fair 
cross-section of the community, a defendant must prove in part 'that the representation of[ an allegedly 
underrepresented] group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to 
the number of such persons in the community."' Id (quoting Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364 
(1979)). Because the court found the defendant failed to satisfy the second Duren element-that 
representation of the distinctive group in the community in venires from which juries are selected is 
unfair and unreasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community-the court did not 
reach Duren's third element-that the underrepresentation of a distinctive group in the community is 
due to systematic exclusion of the group in the jury selection process. Id. at 703 n.6. 
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number of Spanish speakers in the Circuit, courts have generated the greatest 
amount of law on this issue. Finally, it compares the reasoning and results of fair 
cross section cases in these two circuits and concludes that the law as applied in the 
First Circuit is unjust. 
A. Puerto Rico's Linguistic Landscape 
In most states the majority of residents meet the federal jury service 
requirements: citizenship, age of majority, no felony record, and English 
proficiency. 26 Even in California, the state with the greatest percentage of Spanish 
speakers after Puerto Rico, Spanish speakers represent only approximately one 
quarter of the state's population, and although there are no accurate statistics 
showing the number of non-citizens living in the state, it is unlikely that they 
comprise over half of the population. 27 Conversely, eighty percent of Puerto Ricans 
identify themselves as unable to communicate effectively in English. 28 
As demographics in the United States continue to change, the question of 
whether statistically significant underrepresentation on juries of group members 
who make up the majority of a state's residents may eventually become relevant to 
courts outside the District of Puerto Rico. 29 Currently, however, Puerto Rico's 
situation is unique, requiring different analysis and different results. On the 
mainland United States, non-English-speaking children must learn English at 
school and often attend special programs to accelerate this process. 30 Scholastic 
success and, in most instances, the acquisition of gainful employment depend on a 
firm grasp of the English language. Most daily transactions, such as banking, 
purchasing goods, navigating public transportation systems and roads, and 
26. 28 U.S.C. § 1865 (b)(I) (A person is qualified to serve on a grand jury or a petit jury in the 
district court unless, among other factors, he "is not a citizen of the United States eighteen years old who 
has resided for a period of one year within the judicial district."); id.§ 1865 (b)(5) (A person is qualified 
to serve on a grand jury or a petit jury in the district court unless, among other factors, he "has a charge 
pending against him for the commission of, or has been convicted in a State or Federal court of record 
of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for more than one year and his civil rights have not been 
restored."); id. § 1865 (b)(2)-(3). 
27. ALEJANDRA LOPEZ, STAN. UNIV., CTR. FOR COMPARATIVE STUDIES IN RACE AND ETHNICITY 
CALIFORNIANS' USE OF ENGLISH AND OTHER LANGUAGES: CENSUS 2000 SUMMARY I (2003), available 
at http://www.stanford.edu/dept/csre/reports/execsum _I 4.pdf. 
28. Selected Social Characteristics in the United States: Puerto Rico: 2006-2008, U.S. CENSUS 
BUREAU, http://www.factfinder.census.gov (follow "FACT Sheet" hyperlink; under "state" tab, select 
"Puerto Rico;" follow "GO" hyperlink; then follow "show more" Social Characteristics hyperlink) (last 
visited Nov. 12, 2010) [hereinafter Selected Social Characteristics Puerto Rico] (Of the 95.3% of Puerto 
Ricans who speak a language other than English at home, 81.2% speak English less than "very well."). 
29. Some studies indicate that Hispanics may comprise one in three Americans by the year 2042. 
See, e.g., U.S. Minorities Will Be the Majority by 2042, Census Bureau Says, AMERICA.GOV (Aug. 15, 
2008), http://www.america.gov/st/peopleplace-english/2008/August/20080815140005xlrenneftl.107810 
6.html. It is difficult to estimate what percentage of this majority might not be jury-eligible due to the 
age, English proficiency, and citizenship requirements of28 U.S.C. § 1865(b). 
30. For example, in 1998 California passed Proposition 227, the English in Public Schools Initiative 
Statute, requiring California public schools to teach "Limited English Proficient" (LEP) students in 
special, virtually all-English classes, eliminating previous bilingual ones. Enrollment in an LEP class 
was not expected to last for more than a year. Cal. Prop. 227 §1 (1998) (codified at CAL. EDUC. CODE§ 
305). 
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accessing social services, require a high degree of competency in English. 
Although there are many insulated communities in the United States, particularly in 
larger cities, where social and business interactions occur exclusively in a language 
other than English, stepping outside these communities requires some degree of 
language assimilation. 31 
Puerto Rico's linguistic landscape is precisely the opposite. Although wealthy 
Puerto Ricans, particularly those who were born or educated in the continental 
United States, often send their children to the island's few private English schools, 
the majority of Puerto Rican children receive an education exclusively in Spanish.32 
Although an English class is part of most schools' curriculum, without immersion 
all but the most exceptional students retain little of what they learn in school.33 
Spanish is the language of the workplace in Puerto Rico. 34 Newspapers, radio, 
television, and film are in Spanish (or subtitled in Spanish). 35 
All Commonwealth legal proceedings take place in Spanish. 36 Puerto Rican 
law schools teach in Spanish,37 and the Puerto Rico bar exam is in Spanish.38 
Although English is a requirement for all jobs with the federal government, fluency 
varies greatly. Aside from formal court proceedings, which federal law mandates 
must take place in English, almost all communication within federal buildings 
occurs in Spanish. 39 In the federal courts, defendants, witnesses, and pro se parties 
speak to the Spanish-speaking judges and juries in Spanish. 40 Lawyers argue in 
31. See, e.g., Rob Para!, The Polish Community in Metro Chicago, POLISH AM. Ass'N 12 (June 
2004), http://www.robparal.com/downloads/Polish Community in Chicago.pdf(showing the presence of 
large, insulated Polish community in Chicago). 
32. See 1990 P.R. Laws 68 § 1.02 (West, Westlaw through PR-Legis 3RS 68) ("It is hereby 
provided that education shall be imparted in Spanish, the vernacular language. English shall be taught as 
a second language."). 
33. The situation is similar to the teaching of French in Canada, an officially bilingual country. See 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the 
Canada Act, 1982, c. 11, § 16(1) (U.K.) ("English and French are the official languages of Canada and 
have equality of equal rights and status and privileges as to their use in all institutions of the Parliament 
and government of Canada."). Although every Canadian child studies French in school, very few retain 
enough of the language to enable them to work or live in French. 
34. Alvarez Gonzalez, supra note 8, at 291. 
35. Id. (detailing the dominance of the Spanish language in Puerto Rican media). The English 
language paper, The San Juan Star, stopped publishing after almost fifty years in 2009. 
36. See People v. Superior Court, 92 P.R. 580, 589-90 (1965) (stating that Spanish is and will 
continue to be the language used in judicial proceedings); P.R. R. CRIM. P. 96(d) (requiring criminal 
jurors "to read and write the Spanish language"); P.R. R. CIV. P. 8.5 (requiring use of Spanish in 
pleadings, motions, petitions and other papers). 
37. See, e.g., Requisitos de Admision (Juris Doctor Admission Requirements), PONTIFICIA 
UNNERSIDAD CATOLICA DE PUERTO RICO, http:/1207.150.249.35/derecho/index.php?option=com_conte 
nt&view=article&id=48&Itemid=58&lang=es (last visited Nov. 12, 2010) (requiring Spanish and 
English fluency for admission to Pontifical Catholic University of Puerto Rico's law school). 
38. Preguntas Mas Frecuentes (Frequently Asked Questions), LA RAMA JUDICIAL DE PUERTO RICO, 
http://www.ramajudicial.pr/junta/faq.htm (last visited Nov. 12, 2010). The examinations are written in 
Spanish, but can be answered in English or Spanish. Id. (original in Spanish). 
39. 48 U.S.C. § 864 ("All pleadings and proceedings in the United States District Court for the 
District of Puerto Rico shall be conducted in the English language."). 
40 . . See Jackson v. Garcia, 665 F.2d 395, 396 n.l (!st Cir. 1981) ("Although I L.P.R.A. § 51, 
enacted in 1902, provides that English and Spanish 'shall be used indiscriminately' in the 
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varying degrees of English proficiency. An interpreter translates the Spanish 
testimony for the benefit of the court reporter, who creates an English transcript. 
The reviewing court will base its decision on the English record, but the judge and 
jury in the district court inevitably reach their conclusions based on the testimony 
they heard in their native tongue. In their chambers, judges communicate with 
lawyers, the press, their staff, and their Spanish-speaking clerks in Spanish, and 
secretaries and court employees conduct office business in Spanish. A small 
number of law clerks and other employees within the federal system, such as 
Assistant United States Attorneys, come from the mainland. Puerto Ricans usually 
speak English in their presence. 
According to the District of Puerto Rico's website, every four years, after an 
election, the court randomly selects jurors from certified lists of registered voters. 41 
The court mails out questionnaires to these individuals explaining the grounds for 
both automatic excusal and excusal upon request. 42 The website states that "[ m ]ost 
people that are able to read, write, speak, and understand the English language are 
qualified to become jurors."43 
A 2006 United States Census Bureau survey reported that 95.3% of Puerto 
Rico's population speak a language other than English at home, with 95.2% 
speaking Spanish at home. 44 Other states with significant numbers of Spanish 
speakers trailed far behind in the percentage who speak a language other than 
English at home: 33.7% in Texas,45 35.8% in New Mexico,46 42.4% in 
California,47 27.9% in Arizona,48 27.3% in Nevada,49 25.8% in Florida,50 and 
Commonwealth courts, the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico has interpreted that statute to authorize 
Spanish alone, with interpreters when needed ... ")(citing People v. Superior Court, 92 P.R. at 590); 
Gonzales Rose, supra note 22. As of August 2010, there was one native English-speaking judge in the 
District of Puerto Rico, Magistrate Judge Bruce McGiverin. 
41. Jury Service Information, U.S. DIST. COURT FOR THE DIST. OF P.R., http://www.prd.uscourts.go 
v/courtweb/gp_JuryService.aspx (last visited Nov. 12, 2010). The selection method accords with the 
Federal Jury Service and Selection Act, which designates voter registration lists as the main, but not 
exclusive, source of potential juror selection. 28 U.S.C. § 1863(b)(2). 
42. Automatic excusal applies to active or reserve members of the armed forces, firefighters, police 
or law enforcement agents, and public officials in the executive, legislative, or judicial branches of the 
federal, state, or municipal government. Id. Excusal upon request is available to people aged seventy or 
over, individuals who have served in the last two years, clergy members, teachers, full time students, 
people responsible for the full time care of children under ten or an elderly or handicapped dependent, 
practicing physicians or dentists, health services professionals, practicing attorneys, and volunteer safety 
personnel in a public agency. Id. 
43. Id. 
44. Selected Social Characteristics Puerto Rico, supra note 28. 
45. Selected Social Characteristics in the United States: Texas: 2006-2008, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
http://www.factfinder.census.gov (follow "FACT Sheet" hyperlink; under "state" tab, select "Texas;" 
follow "GO" hyperlink; then follow "show more" Social Characteristics hyperlink) (last visited Nov. 12, 
2010) [hereinafter Selected Social Characteristics Texas]. 
46. Selected Social Characteristics in the United States: New Mexico: 2006-2008, U.S. CENSUS 
BUREAU, http://www.factfinder.census.gov (follow "FACT Sheet" hyperlink; under "state" tab, select 
''New Mexico;" follow "GO" hyperlink; then follow "show more" Social Characteristics hyperlink) (last 
visited Nov. 12, 20 JO) [hereinafter Selected Social Characteristics New Mexico]. 
47. Selected Social Characteristics in the United States: California: 2006-2008, U.S. CENSUS 
BUREAU, http://www.factfinder.census.gov (follow "FACT Sheet" hyperlink; under "state" tab, select 
"California;" follow "GO" hyperlink; then follow "show more" Social Characteristics hyperlink) (last 
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28.9% in New York. 51 The percentage of Puerto Ricans who speak a language 
other than English at home who speak English at a level less than "very well," a 
fact that likely would exclude them from jury service, was 81.2%. 52 For 
Californians that number was 19.9%,53 14.5% for Texans, 54 13.2% for New 
Yorkers, 55 13.0% for Nevadans, 56 12.1% for Arizonans,57 11.7% for Floridians, 58 
and 10.2% for New Mexicans. 59 Only 39.7% of Puerto Ricans in the labor force 
were employed, with 45.3% Jiving below the poverty level. 60 Regarding education, 
66.4% of Puerto Ricans twenty five years old and over had at least a high school 
degree and 21 % had at least a bachelor's degree61-a percentage drastically lower 
than the United States' average educational attainment. 62 
Conducting court proceedings in English on an island where the vast majority 
of participants in the legal system can communicate more effectively in their native 
tongue is a manifestation of the colonialist relationship that began when the United 
States acquired Puerto Rico from Spain in the Spanish American War in 1898. 63 
visited Nov. 12, 2010) [hereinafter Selected Social Characteristics California]. 
48. Selected Social Characteristics in the United Stales: Arizona: 2006-2008, U.S. CENSUS 
BUREAU, http://www.factfinder.census.gov (follow "FACT Sheet" hyperlink; under "state" tab, select 
"Arizona;" follow "GO" hyperlink; then follow "show more" Social Characteristics hyperlink) (last 
visited Nov. 12, 2010) [hereinafter Selected Social Characteristics Arizona]. 
49. Selected Social Characteristics in the United Stales: Nevada: 2006-2008, U.S. CENSUS 
BUREAU, http://www.factfinder.census.gov (follow "FACT Sheet" hyperlink; under "state" tab, select 
"Nevada;" follow "GO" hyperlink; then follow "show more" Social Characteristics hyperlink) (last 
visited Nov. 12, 2010) [hereinafter Selected Social Characteristics Nevada]. 
50. Selected Social Characteristics in the United States: Florida: 2006-2008, U.S. CENSUS 
BUREAU, http://www.factfinder.census.gov (follow "FACT Sheet" hyperlink; under "state" tab, select 
"Florida;" follow "GO" hyperlink; then follow "show more" Social Characteristics hyperlink) (last 
visited Nov. 12, 2010) [hereinafter Selected Social Characteristics Florida]. 
51. Selected Social Characteristics in the United Stales: New York: 2006-2008, U.S. CENSUS 
BUREAU, http://www.factfinder.census.gov (follow "FACT Sheet" hyperlink; under "state" tab, select 
"New York;" follow "GO" hyperlink; then follow "show more" Social Characteristics hyperlink) (last 
visited Nov. 12, 2010) [hereinafter Selected Social Characteristics New York]. 
52. Selected Social Characteristics Puerto Rico, supra note 28. 
53. Selected Social Characteristics California, supra note 47. 
54. Selected Social Characteristics Texas, supra note 45. 
55. Selected Social Characteristics New York, supra note 51. 
56. Selected Social Characteristics Nevada, supra note 49. 
57. Selected Social Characteristics Arizona, supra note 48. 
58. Selected Social Characteristics Florida, supra note 50. 
59. Selected Social Characteristics New Mexico, supra note 46. 
60. Selected Economic Characteristics in the United States: Puerto Rico: 2006-2008, U.S. CENSUS 
BUREAU, http://www.factfinder.census.gov (follow "FACT Sheet" hyperlink; under "state" tab, select 
"Puerto Rico;" then follow "show more" Economic Characteristics hyperlink) (last visited Nov. 12, 
20 I 0) [hereinafter Economic Characteristics Puerto Rico]. 
61. Selected Social Characteristics Puerto Rico, supra note 28. 
62. Selected Social Characteristics in the United States: 2006-2008, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://w 
ww.factfinder.census.gov (follow "FACT Sheet" hyperlink; then follow "show more" Social 
Characteristics hyperlink) (last visited Nov. 12, 2010). Nearly eighty-five percent of the U.S. population 
age twenty-five and older has attained a high school education or higher, and almost twenty-eight 
percent of the U.S. population age twenty-five or older has attained a bachelor's degree or higher. Id. 
63. See Sylvia R. Lazos Vargas, History, Legal Scholarship, and LatCrit Theory: The Case of 
Racial Transformation Circa the Spanish American War, 1896-1900, 78 DENV. U. L. REV. 921, 927-30 
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The First Circuit has justified upholding this tradition by putting the federal justice 
system's interest in consistency above the constitutional mandate that parties face a 
jury derived from a cross section of their community, and has not considered 
alternative means of satisfying the Sixth Amendment, such as translation. 64 A 
comparison between the First Circuit's Sixth Amendment jurisprudence as applied 
to cases arising in Puerto Rico and fair cross section law in other circuits suggests 
that this reasoning is not legally sound. 
B. Fair Cross Section Challenges in the First Circuit 
In 1958, the First Circuit first entertained the question of whether the 
systematic exclusion of non-English speakers from federal juries in Puerto Rico 
was constitutional. 65 The defendant in Miranda v. United States66 was a Puerto 
Rican attorney convicted of subornation of perjury during the trial of three 
servicemen he represented in a burglary case. 67 Miranda argued that his indictment 
was defective because individuals who could not speak and understand English 
were systematically excluded from the grand jury.68 The court disagreed, holding 
that the provision that "all pleadings and proceedings in the United States District 
Court for the District of Puerto Rico shall be conducted in the English language" 
was necessary to the proper functioning of the court. 69 The court declared that "it is 
reasonable that a court conduct its proceeding in a single language and it is 
obviously essential that the judge, the counsel and all the jurors have a working 
knowledge of that language if the judicial machinery is to function efficiently."70 
The court failed to entertain the idea that, in light of the fact that the judge, 
attorneys, and jurors all spoke Spanish, with proficiency in English ranging from 
good to poor, conducting proceedings in Spanish would in fact achieve the greatest 
efficiency. 71 The court also did not consider any issues beyond efficiency. 
(2001) (giving a brief history of the events of the Spanish American War, noting that the United States 
"declared Puerto Rico its own as a 'war indemnity"' during treaty negotiations with Spain, and 
describing the war's result as "the United States' first step to colonialism"). 
64. See, e.g., United States v. Rivera-Rosario, 300 F.3d I, 5 (!st Cir. 2002) ("It is clear, to the point 
of perfect transparency, that federal court proceedings must be conducted in English."); Aponte-Suarez, 
905 F.2d at 491-92 (asserting that the "overwhelming national interest" is served by conducting 
proceedings in the District of Puerto Rico in English, which requires jurors to be proficient in English); 
Benmuhar, 658 F.2d at 19-20 (holding that a significant state interest in "having a branch of the national 
court system operate in the national language" is advanced by the English proficiency requirement); 
Miranda, 255 F.2d at 16 (upholding the reasonableness of juror English-language proficiency 
requirement in federal district courts). 
65. Miranda,255F.2dat16-17. 
66. 255 F. 2d 9 (!st Cir. 1958). 
67. Id. at 11. 
68. Id. at 16. 
69. Id. (citing 48 U.S.C. § 864). 
70. Id. at 16-17. 
71. In 1952 President Truman appointed Clemente Ruiz-Nazario as the first Puerto Rican judge to 
serve on the District Court of Puerto Rico. Clemente Ruiz Nazario, U.S. DIST. COURT FOR THE DIST. OF 
P.R., http://www.prd.uscourts.gov/CourtWeb/biosjudge_Nazario.aspx (last visited Nov. 12, 2010). 
After that date, all appointed judges were bilingual. See Judges for the United States District Court for 
the District of Puerto Rico 1899-Present, U.S. DIST. COURT FOR THE DIST. OF P.R., 
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In the 1968 case United States v. Valentine, 72 the District Court of Puerto Rico 
faced an attack on the constitutionality of the statutory requirement that 
proceedings be conducted in English, the statutory English-language requirement 
for jurors, and the failure of grand and petit juries to constitute a cross section of 
the community. 73 The defendants had been indicted for refusing to submit to 
induction into the United States Armed Forces. 74 The court noted Puerto Rico's 
unique status as the only "state or territory in which the primary language of a 
majority of the American citizens resident therein is other than English."75 
Significantly, the court stated that forcing nonresidents to litigate through 
interpreters would "compromise[]" and "unreasonably restrict[]" the court's 
function of "offering an opportunity to nonresidents of resorting to a tribunal not 
subject to local influence."76 The court did not demonstrate similar sympathy for 
Puerto Rican residents who, by virtue of the court's decision to uphold the 
constitutionality of the statutes,77 have been compelled to litigate virtually all of 
their cases through interpreters. 
The court viewed the use of Spanish during proceedings as a significant 
limitation on the ability of the Attorney General, his staff, and judges from other 
districts sitting by designation to participate in judicial proceedings in the district. 78 
The court also decried "the strong possibility of injustice through distortion of 
meaning in translation" of federal statutes written in English, 79 along with "the 
body of law developed throughout the rest of the federal system."80 The court 
acknowledged in a footnote that appeals from the Commonwealth required 
translation, but dismissed potential injustice arising from distortion of meaning of 
those translations with the assertion that "the final judgments of the commonwealth 
courts are infrequently subject to federal review, and such review rarely raises 
questions whose resolution necessitates a precise parsing of the language appearing 
in the record."81 The court likely did not anticipate that, over forty years later, the 
federal court would engage in extensive review of Commonwealth cases. Also, 
despite noting that the annotated laws of Puerto Rico and its supreme court cases 
are translated into English, the court failed to acknowledge the fact that these 
http://www.prd.uscourts.gov/CourtWeb/bios_intro.aspx#List (pointing out that only Puerto Ricans were 
appointed after Judge Nazario); Rivera-Rosario, 300 F.3d at 5 (proclaiming that judges must conduct 
federal court proceedings in English). In 1958, when the First Circuit decided Miranda, the sole district 
court judge, the Honorable Clemente Ruiz-Nazario, was a native Spanish speaker. See Clemente Ruiz 
Nazario, supra note 71 (noting that a second federal judge for Puerto Rico was not appointed until 
1965). 
72. 288 F. Supp. 957 (D.P.R. 1968). 
73. Id. at 961-62. 
74. Id. at 961. 
75. Id. at 963. 
76. Id. at 964 (citing Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 312 (1922)). 
77. See id. at 963 ("It does not follow, however, that because proceedings in local courts are 
conducted in Spanish, proceedings in [federal] court must also be conducted in that language. This court 
is not a local court of Puerto Rico .... [I]t is a United States district court."). 
78. Valentine, 288 F. Supp. at 964. 
79. Id. 
80. Id. at 965. 
81. Id. at 964 n.9. 
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translations are often poor, and thus of little assistance to federal clerks and judges 
conducting review. 82 
Declaring a defendant's right to a fair trial to be personal, not collective, the 
court stated that it is "no more of a constitutional violation to try non-English 
speaking defendants in English in [Puerto Rico's district] court than to try other 
non-English speaking defendants in English in any other federal district court."83 
Rejecting the defendants' contention that the English-language requirement 
represented an unjust qualification for jury service, the court asserted that there is 
no constitutional requirement that "juries be drawn from a cross section of the total 
population without the imposition of any qualifications."84 
In 1981, in United States v. Benmuhar, 85 a Puerto Rican defendant convicted 
of arson argued before the First Circuit that the Supreme Court's decision in Duren 
v. Missouri 86 demanded an outcome different from the result in Miranda87 and a 
holding that the jury selection process violated his Sixth Amendment right to a jury 
comprised of a fair cross section of the community. 88 Reversing the Missouri 
Supreme Court, Duren held that the systematic exclusion of women from jury 
service in Missouri violated the Constitution's fair cross section requirement, as 
jury venires included, on average, less than fifteen percent female jurors. 89 Duren 
laid out three factors necessary to establish a prima facie case of unconstitutional 
jury disproportionality: 
(1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a "distinctive" group in 
the community; (2) that the representation of this group in venires 
from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to 
the number of such persons in the community; and (3) that this 
underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion of the group in the 
jury-selection process. 90 
After a defendant successfully establishes a prima facie case of disproportionality, 
the government has the opportunity to show that no constitutional violation has 
occurred by demonstrating that the jury qualification "manifestly and primarily" 
82. See id. at 965 n. l 0 (recognizing the availability of English translations of local laws, which the 
court contrasted against the poor prospect for Spanish translations of federal laws without making 
mention of the quality of the local translations). 
83. Id. at 965. 
84. Valentine, 288 F. Supp. at 965 (citing Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 130 (1940)). Valentine 
noted that, traditionally, juries are a representative body of the community drawn from qualified 
individuals, denial of jury service on the basis of race-an impermissible qualification-results in the 
exclusion of "otherwise qualified groups" in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Id. at 965 n.13. 
85. 658 F.2d 14. 
86. 439 U.S. 357. 
87. 255 F.2d 9. See supra text accompanying notes 65-71 (discussing Miranda, which held that a 
Puerto Rican defendant's indictment was not defective despite the fact that non-English speakers were 
excluded from the grand jury, because all federal legal proceedings must be conducted in English). 
88. Benmuhar, 658 F.2d at 19 (citing Duren, 439 U.S. at 364). 
89. Duren, 439 U.S. at 360. 
90. Id. at 364. 
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advances a "significant state interest. "91 
Although the First Circuit did not explore this issue, the second prong of this 
test leaves open the question of whether representation should be measured by 
comparing the number of group members in jury venires with the number of group 
members in the community as a whole, or solely with jury-eligible group members. 
In a district completely made up of group members, such as Spanish speakers in 
Puerto Rico, this distinction is simply not relevant. 
The Court did discuss the potential exclusion of some group members from 
the statistical analysis, however, as it pertained to the ultimate inquiry into whether 
a constitutional violation occurred, as opposed to the initial establishment of a 
prima facie case. The Court noted that "[ s ]tates remain free to prescribe relevant 
qualifications for their jurors and to provide reasonable exemptions so long as it 
may be fairly said that the jury lists or panels are representative of the 
community."92 Nonetheless, where a significant state interest in their 
implementation provides "adequate justification," these exemptions may result in 
disproportionate exclusion that passes constitutional muster. 93 Missouri suggested, 
but failed to demonstrate, that other exemptions furthering significant state 
interests, such as those for individuals over age sixty-five, teachers, and 
government workers, caused the underrepresentation. The state's failure to offer 
any substantial justification for the underrepresentation of women on juries led the 
Court to believe that the exclusion of women resulted from the systematic 
application of their automatic exemption. 94 
In Benmuhar, the defendant identified nine distinctive groups that he claimed 
did not have fair and reasonable representation on Puerto Rican juries: San Juan 
area residents; women; professional-managerial white collar workers; industrial 
farming and fishing workers; unemployed and/or retired housewives; people with 
eighth grade or lower educations; people with more than a high school education; 
whites; and blacks. 95 The defendant attributed all of this alleged disproportionality 
to the English-language requirement. 96 Applying the Duren test and the reasoning 
of Valentine, the court held that the English-language requirement primarily and 
manifestly advanced the government's significant interest in "having a branch of 
the national court system operate in the national language."97 
Although the court upheld the requirement, it labeled its judgment "a narrow 
one" and expressed no opinion "as to the ability of Congress to achieve different 
results through legislation or as to a case in which the appellant identified and the 
government did not respond to policy accommodations that could achieve the 
national language interest without the need for such an English proficiency 
91. Id. at 367-68. 
92. Id. at 367 (quoting Taylor, 419 U.S. at 538). 
93. Id. at 371. 
94. Id. at 368-69 ("Assuming, arguendo, that the exemptions mentioned by the court below would 
justify failure to achieve a fair community cross section on jury venires, the State must demonstrate that 
these exemptions caused the underrepresentation complained of."). 
95. Benmuhar, 658 F.2d at 19 n.2. 
96. Id. at 19 (arguing that "systematic exclusion" is the result of the only "systematic" 
characteristic-the requirement to be proficient in English either in reading and writing, or speaking). 
97. Id. at 19-20. 
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requirement for jurors."98 Despite Benmuhar's narrow holding, however, the First 
Circuit applied it to a new challenge to the composition of grand and petit juries 
nine years later. 99 
The defendants in United States v. Aponte-Suarez100 argued that their 
indictment was defective because the grand and petit jurors lacked proficiency in 
English and sought to prove that English proficiency among Puerto Ricans had 
declined to such an extent that this decline created an adverse effect on Puerto 
Rican federal juries. 101 The court applied the Duren test, 102 concluding that even if 
the defendants proved the existence of a smaller pool of eligible jurors and 
systematic exclusion in the jury selection process, "the overwhelming national 
interest served by the use of English in a United States court justifies conducting 
proceedings in the District of Puerto Rico in English and requiring jurors to be 
proficient in that language." 103 
The First Circuit followed Aponte-Suarez in United States v. Flores-Rivera, 104 
dismissing the defendant's contention that the exclusion of two-thirds of Puerto 
Rico's population from federal jury duty violated his Fifth and Sixth Amendment 
rights. 105 In 2002, in response to a suggestion that Puerto Rico's district court 
provide simultaneous translation fo prevent exclusion of the poor from the petit 
juror pool, the First Circuit rejected the defendants' contention that Benmuhar 
relied on the fact that its defendants did not propose any viable alternatives to the 
current system. 106 In the same year, the First Circuit declared that "[i]t is clear, to 
the point of perfect transparency, that federal court proceedings must be conducted 
in English." 107 Analyzing a challenge to the introduction into evidence of Spanish 
transcripts based on the district court's finding that the English translations were 
inaccurate, the court pronounced that "[t]he policy interest in keeping the District 
of Puerto Rico as an integrated part of the federal judiciary is too great to allow 
parties to convert that court into a Spanish language court at their whim." 108 It 
further explained: 
98. Id. at 20. 
99. Aponte-Suarez, 905 F.2d at 492 n.4 (citing § 1865(b)(2)-(3) for the position that federal law 
requires grand and petit jurors both to speak English and to possess the reading, writing, and 
comprehension skills necessary to complete a juror qualification form). 
100. 905 F.2d 483. 
101. Id. at 491-92 (noting that the defendants supported this position with "newspaper accounts 
claiming a decline in English proficiency among the general population of Puerto Rico"). 
102. See supra text accompanying note 90 (quoting the Duren test). 
I 03. Id. at 492 (citing Benmuhar, 658 F.2d at 19). 
104. 56 F.3d 319 (1st Cir. 1995). 
JOS. Id. at 326; see also United States v. Escobar-de Jesus, 187 F.3d 148, 166 (!st Cir. 1999) 
(treating the challenge to the constitutionality of the English requirement for jurors as having been 
decided in Aponte-Suarez just as Flores-Rivera did). 
106. United States v. Dubon-Otero, 292 F.3d 1, 17 (1st Cir. 2002) (concluding that the national 
language interest, and not the lack of any viable alternative, justifies conducting proceedings only in 
English in the District Court of Puerto Rico (citing Flores-Rivera, 56 F.3d at 326)). 
107. Rivera-Rosario, 300 F.3d at 5. 
108. Id. at S, 8 n.9. 
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With a disturbing frequency, district courts in Puerto Rico have 
allowed parties to offer briefs, documents, and testimony in Spanish 
without translation. Though we recognize that most jurors, and even 
judges, in Puerto Rico may be more comfortable speaking in Spanish 
than in English, district courts must be faithfully committed to the 
English-language requirement. If not, the District of Puerto Rico 
risks disassociating itself from the rest of the federal judiciary. More 
importantly, appellate courts cannot properly review district court 
convictions on the basis of translations, later claimed as evidence, 
that were neither read nor heard by the jury. 109 
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More recently, rejecting a Sixth Amendment claim based on a defendant's 
contention that public-housing residents have been systematically excluded from 
Puerto Rico federal juries, the First Circuit reasserted the validity of the English-
language requirement based on "the overwhelming national interest served by the 
use of English in a United States court." 110 In spite of Puerto Rico's unique 
demographics rendering the effects of disproportionality more extreme than in any 
other district that has contemplated similar challenges, the First Circuit's 
commitment to upholding the constitutionality of the English-language requirement 
has become increasingly entrenched. 
C. Fair Cross Section Challenges in the Ninth Circuit 
Other circuit and district courts located in areas with large Spanish-speaking 
communities have faced similar challenges by defendants alleging unconstitutional 
underrepresentation of Spanish speakers, or "Hispanics," on the juries they 
faced. 111 In these cases, the English-language requirement, though often comprising 
one factor in the analysis, has not been the sole concern. In communities made up 
largely of immigrants from Spanish-speaking countries such as Mexico, other jury 
qualifications, such as United States citizenship, have caused courts to grapple with 
the question of whether the analysis under Duren's second prong, seeking to 
determine if representation is "fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such 
persons in the community," 112 should be based on the total number of community 
members or the subset of eligible jurors within that community. 113 The Ninth 
109. Id. at 20-21; see also United States v. Gonzalez-Maldonado, 115 F.3d 9, 18 n.3 (!st Cir. 1997) 
(stating that the use of English is necessary for the creation of an appellate record because appellate 
judges do not have the benefit of an official translator enjoyed by district court judges). 
110. Gonzalez-Velez, 466 F.3d at 38, 40 (quoting Aponte-Suarez, 905 F.2d at 492). 
ll I. See, e.g., United States v. Artero, 121 F.3d 1256, 1260 (9th Cir. 1997) ("Artero argues that the 
grand jury that indicted him was not a fair cross section of the population, because it underrepresented 
persons of Hispanic ethnicity."); Torres-Hernandez, 447 F.3d at 702 ("[Torres-Hernandez] argued that, 
in violation of the Sixth Amendment, the systematic exclusion of Hispanics in Southern District of 
California grand jury venires had resulted in a grand jury that did not represent a fair cross-section of the 
community."). 
112. Duren, 439 U.S. at 364. 
113. See, e.g., Artero, 121 F.3d at 1261-62 ("If Hispanics in Imperial and San Diego Counties were 
less likely than others to be citizens, then non-citizenship rather than systematic exclusion of qualified 
individuals would explain both lower percentages of registered voters and lower representation in the 
jury wheel."). The fact that these issues arise in the context of immigrant communities also accounts for 
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Circuit has generated the greatest amount of law on this issue, ultimately denying 
every fair cross section challenge it considered based on the conclusion that only 
jury-eligible members are relevant to the analysis and the challengers' inability to 
establish unconstitutional underrepresentation grounded in the resulting statistical 
comparison. 114 
In United States v. Esquivel, 115 the defendant, charged with bringing an illegal 
alien into the United States, challenged the partiality of the jury based on the fair 
cross section requirement of the Sixth Amendment116 and the Equal Protection 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 117 The court agreed with the government 
that, to establish a prima facie case of a Sixth Amendment violation under Duren's 
second prong, the relevant Hispanic community with which the percentage of 
Hispanics on the jury should be compared, should include only jury-eligible 
community members. 118 Calculating the number of Hispanic citizens in the 
Southern District of California over eighteen years of age according to census data 
significantly reduced the total relevant population, rendering the defendant unable 
to establish an unconstitutional disparity. 119 
The next year, in United States v. Artero, 120 the defendant, convicted of 
smuggling marijuana across the border and possession with intent to distribute, 
challenged the representation of Hispanics on the grand jury that indicted him. 121 
Noting that the Southern District of California judges had stated that the two 
counties comprising the district, both of which bordered Mexico, "would likely 
have many Hispanic residents who had not yet attained citizenship or English 
proficiency, because they had only recently come to the United States," the Ninth 
the use of the word "Hispanic" to describe a racial/ethnic category, as opposed to "Spanish speaker," 
which, in Puerto Rico, differentiates potential jurors solely on the basis of their language skills. 
114. See, e.g., Torres-Hernandez, 447 F.3d at 701-02 ("We hold that, to determine whether Hispanics 
are underrepresented to an unconstitutional degree in venires, a district court must rely on that evidence 
which most accurately reflects the judicial district's actual percentage of jury-eligible Hispanics. 
Because the district court here used the most accurate data presented to it by the parties--data that 
excluded segments of the Hispanic population ineligible for jury service-we affirm Torres-
Hernandez's conviction and sentence."). 
115. 88 F.3d 722 (9th Cir. 1996). 
116. Id. at 724-26. 
117. Id. at 727. Fourteenth Amendment challenges to the grand jury selection process are analyzed 
according to the standard set forth in Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 494 (1977). Id. at 725. To 
establish a prima facie case under Castaneda, an appellant may demonstrate discrimination in jury 
selection by showing: (1) that he/she is part of a recognizable, distinct class, (2) underrepresentation 
exists by measuring the size of the group in the general population against the size of the group called to 
serve as grand jurors over a significant period of time. Id. (citing Castaneda, 430 U.S. at 494). 
118. Id. at 726-27 (concluding that in order to calculate the statistical data required to prove the 
second prong of the Duren test-that the jury pool is an inaccurate representation of the community-
the court limits the general population pool to those eligible to serve on juries by taking judicial notice 
of 1990 census data showing the number of jury-eligible individuals). 
119. Esquivel, 88 F.3d at 727; Artero, 121 F.3d at 1261 ("Once the category of Hispanics was 
narrowed down to those Hispanics eligible to serve on juries, the disparity dropped from the defense 
claim of 14.5% to 4.9%."). The Esquivel court assumed that all of these individuals had sufficient 
fluency in English to qualify for jury service. Esquivel, 88 F.3d at 727. 
120. 121 F.3d 1256. 
121. Id. at 1257, 1260. 
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Circuit concluded that "the percentage of Hispanics eligible for federal jury service 
in those two counties was likely to be lower than the ratio for the general 
population." 122 The court rejected the defendant's expert's testimony regarding the 
likely Hispanic population of the counties because the demographer did not answer 
the "right question" of "whether Hispanics eligible to serve on federal juries were 
unreasonably underrepresented because of systematic exclusion."123 
Acknowledging Duren's failure to make this distinction, the court commented 
that, "in Duren, there was no reason to doubt the usefulness of comparing the 
percentage of women summoned for jury service to the percentage in the district, 
because there is no reason to think women would be disproportionately ineligible to 
serve on juries."124 The court contrasted this situation with that of immigrants in 
border counties and ports of entry, explaining that "[i]t took many of our ancestors 
a while to learn English and become citizens." 125 The court also announced that, in 
reaching its conclusion, it was following the Fifth Circuit's holding in United States 
v. Fike 126 that "the pertinent inquiry is the pool of[members of the relevant group] 
in the district who are eligible to serve as jurors." 127 
Eight years later, in United States v. Rodriguez-Lara, 128 the Ninth Circuit 
reached a different conclusion. 129 Charged with being a deported alien found in the 
United States, and appearing pro se, the defendant moved to dismiss his indictment 
based on the underrepresentation of Hispanics in the jury pool of the Fresno 
Division of the Eastern District of California and sought appointment of a 
demographic expert to assist him in developing this claim. 130 The district court 
denied the motion, holding that, based on evidence submitted by the government, 
the defendant could not demonstrate underrepresentation in relation to "the subset 
of the population meeting all the federal juror-eligibility requirements." 131 
The Ninth Circuit disagreed with the district court's use of the jury-eligible 
population as the measure of comparison to establish a prima facie case. 
Emphasizing Duren's use of the word "community" without modification and the 
Court's subsequent reiteration of this standard in Teague v. Lane, 132 the court stated 
122. Id. at 1261. 
123. Id. (emphasis added). 
124. Id. at 1262 (citing Duren, 439 U.S. at 365-66). 
125. Id. at 1262. 
126. 82 F.3d 1315 (5th Cir. 1996), overruled by United States v. Brown, 161 F.3d 256 (5th Cir. 
1998). 
127. Artero, 121 F.3d at 1262 (quoting Fike, 82 F.3d at 1321 (analyzing representation of African-
Arnericans on a venire panel under Duren)). Courts in other districts have reached similar conclusions. 
See, e.g., Silva v. Sec'y, Dep't of Corr., No. 8:06-cv-2257-T-17TBM, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 102759, at 
*17 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 10. 2008) (stating that "any claim of under-representation would still require an 
accounting of such factors as citizenship, prior felony conviction, as well as the ability to speak and 
understand English."). 
128. 421 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2005). 
129. See id. at 947 (finding the district court abused its discretion when it denied the defendant's 
motion to appoint an expert to establish his Sixth Amendment cross section claim in light of the strength 
of the showing the defendant established even without an expert). 
130. Id. at 937-38. 
131. Id. at 938. 
132. 489 U.S. 288 (1989). 
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that the "weight of Supreme Court and circuit authority teaches that, for purposes 
of the prima facie case, the proportion of the distinctive group in the jury pool is to 
be compared with the proportion of the group in the whole community." 133 The 
court distinguished Esquivel on the grounds that, in Esquivel, the record contained 
population data broken down by age, then acknowledged a conflict in the circuit 
between the line of cases it cited to support its position and Artero, as well as a 
decision following Artero, Sanders v. Woodford. 134 The court dismissed Artero as 
wrongly decided, identified a Ninth Circuit case decided eight years before Artero, 
United States v. Sanchez-Lopez, 135 as binding authority on the issue, and held that a 
defendant's prima facie case for a fair cross section claim may rely on a 
comparison to total population data or, where available in the record, age-eligible 
population data. 136 The court bolstered its holding with its view that requiring 
defendants to sort out from the general population figures the number of 
individuals not fluent in English would impose a potentially insuperable burden on 
fair cross section claimants. 137 
The Ninth Circuit resolved the conflict between Artero and Rodriguez-Lara in 
United States v. Torres-Hernandez 138 when it held that a district court need not and 
may not take into account Hispanics who are ineligible for jury service to 
determine whether Hispanics are underrepresented on grand jury venires. 139 To 
support this ruling, the court relied on Esquivel's principle that "[w]hen presented 
with various types of data to determine whether Hispanics are underrepresented on 
grand jury venires, a court must rely on the statistical data that best approximates 
the percentage of jury-eligible Hispanics in the district." 140 In light of both Artero's 
and Rodriguez-Lara's approval of Esquivel, the Ninth Circuit's reasoning appears 
sound. 141 
133. Rodriguez-Lara, 421 F.3d at 941 (citing Duren, 439 U.S. at 364 n.21, 365 n.23, and Teague, 489 
U.S. at 301 n.I). The court also found related support in Castaneda, 430 U.S. at 495-96, Turner v. 
Fouche, 396 U.S. 346, 359 (1970), and Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 627 (1972). Rodriguez-
Lara, 421 F .3d at 941. 
134. Id. at 942-43 (citing Esquivel, 88 F.3d at 726-27, Artero, 121 F.3d at 1261-62, and Sanders v. 
Woodford, 373 F.3d 1054, 1069-70 (9th Cir. 2004), rev'd on other grounds, Brown v. Sanders, 546 U.S. 
212 (2006)); see also Sanders, 373 F.3d at 1069-70 (faulting the defendant's expert for "his assumption 
that every adult Hispanic person in Kern County who was not a legal, registered immigrant from Mexico 
was a jury-eligible United States citizen," which likely "substantially overstated" the 
underrepresentation of Hispanics in the jury venire ). 
135. 879 F.2d 541 (9th Cir. 1989). 
136. Rodriguez-Lara, 421 F.3d at 943. Rodriguez-Lara relies on Sanchez-Lopez's discussion of 
Castaneda's acceptance of total population figures to establish a prima facie case of an equal protection 
violation and on Sanchez-Lopez's interpretation of Duren to "suggest[]" that where the government does 
not present evidence to challenge a defendant's statistics, it could assume that the statistics were valid. 
Sanchez-Lopez, 879 F.2d at 547. 
137. Rodriguez-Lara, 421 F.3d at 943 n.9. 
138. 447 F.3d 699. 
139. Id. at 70 I. 
140. Id. at 704. 
141. See Artero, 121 F.3d at 1260-61 (approving of Esquive/'s rule that the relevant consideration in 
a fair cross section challenge to Hispanic jury representation is the number of jury-eligible Hispanics in 
the district); Rodriguez-Lara, 421 F.3d at 942 (citing Esquivel to support the conclusion that defendants 
may not rely on statistical data reflecting the total population when more refined data on the jury-eligible 
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Interestingly, the Ninth Circuit never analyzed a fair cross section challenge 
on its merits due to defendants' consistent failure to establish a prima facie case. If 
the court had held that a constitutional violation occurred, it could have easily 
remedied the situation by assembling a new and more representative jury, simply 
by drawing on more group members in the community, of which there would 
presumably be a sufficient number of jury-eligible individuals. This solution is not 
available in the District of Puerto Rico. Absent a legal remedy for the differential 
treatment, the imposition of federal law in the territory becomes questionable. Part 
II explores this dilemma further by examining the District of Puerto Rico's 
manipulation of federal and constitutional law to mete out justice to a minority it 
identified as the island's English speakers. 
II. A CASE STUDY 
As explored above, most federal law is based on an underlying assumption 
that United States citizens are, or should be, English-speaking. As a result, courts' 
interpretations of federal and constitutional law as applied to Puerto Rico may be 
convoluted and even entirely inapposite to plain or well-established meaning. 
Diffenderfer, a 2008 District of Puerto Rico case concerning voters' rights, 
illustrates this problem well. 142 This Part dissects the Diffenderfer opinion and 
explains how the case reflects another dimension of the conflict between language, 
statutory, and constitutional rights. 
In Diffenderfer, plaintiffs brought a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 class action suit on 
behalf of "eligible voters in Puerto Rico who do not speak Spanish" against the 
state election commission and its four commissioners seeking an injunction that 
would require the commission to print bilingual ballots in Spanish and English for 
the highly contentious 2008 gubernatorial election. 143 According to the 2000 
census, the number of affected voters was approximately 362,000 out of the 
island's population of approximately four million, or nine percent. 144 Ruling in 
plaintiffs' favor, the district court held that Spanish-only ballots violated the Voting 
Rights Act (VRA), the Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and 
the First Amendment. 14s 
The VRA provides that no standard, practice, or procedure "shall be imposed 
or applied by any State or political subdivision to deny or abridge the right of any 
citizen of the United States to vote because he is a member of a language minority 
group." 146 Rights protected under this statute include casting a ballot, and having 
such ballot counted properly. 147 The critical question in a claim arising under the 
population is available). 
142. See Diffenderfer, 587 F. Supp. 2d at 345, 347, 350 (construing federal and constitutional laws to 
protect the Puerto Rican "English-monolingual community" as a language minority group that is similar 
to a national, ethnic, or racial minority group and comprises a significant percentage of the eligible 
voters in Puerto Rico). 
I 43. Id. at 341-42. 
144. Id. at 341 n.2. 
145. Id. at 343. 
146. Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(f)(2) (2006). 
147. Id.§ J973I(c)(l). 
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VRA "is whether the use of a contested electoral practice or structure results in 
members of a protected group having less opportunity than other members of the 
electorate to participate in the political process[.]" 148 The VRA also specifically 
prohibits the use of English-only ballots where more than five percent of the 
citizens of voting age belong to a minority language group. 149 For purposes of the 
VRA, the term "language minorities" or "language minority group" means persons 
who are American Indian, Asian American, Alaskan Natives, or of Spanish 
heritage. 150 
Diffenderfer acknowledged that, in light of the VRA's specificity about 
qualifying linguistic minorities, the court could not apply the statute according to 
its explicit terms. 151 Nonetheless, deferring to the Supreme Court's instruction in 
Chisom v. Roemer152 that the VRA "should be interpreted in a manner that provides 
'the broadest possible scope' in combating discrimination," the court decided "to 
look to the spirit and the intent of the law" and accordingly held that Spanish-only 
ballots violated section two of the VRA. 153 Stating that the existence of an English-
monolingual minority group was "clearly not contemplated by Congress," the court 
chose to write this group into the VRA, adding a fifth group to the definition of 
language minorities. 154 
Diffenderfer alternatively held that a Spanish-only ballot system discriminates 
against Plaintiffs on the basis of their national origin, ethnicity, and/or race in 
violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 155 Courts 
analyze racial classifications imposed by a government entity under strict scrutiny, 
requiring the classification to be narrowly tailored to further a compelling 
government interest. 156 Other classifications are subject to rational basis review, 
requiring the regulation to be rationally related to a legitimate state interest. 157 The 
Diffenderfer court held that the decision to print ballots only in Spanish failed to 
survive either level ofreview. 158 
Strict scrutiny applies not only to racial classifications, but also to 
fundamental rights, such as the right to vote, when the burden on this right is 
severe. 159 Diffenderfer based its strict scrutiny analysis on its assertion that the 
English-only ballot system encompassed both racial discrimination and a threat to 
148. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 63 (1986) (plurality opinion). 
149. 42 u.s.c. § l 973b(f)(3). 
150. Id.§ 1973l(c)(3). 
151. Diffenderfer, 587 F. Supp. 2d at 344. 
152. 501 U.S.380(1991). 
153. Diffenderfer, 587 F. Supp. 2d at 345 (quoting Chisom, 501 U.S. at 403). 
154. Id. 
155. Id. 
156. See, e.g., Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, SOS (200S) (holding that "all racial classifications 
[imposed by the government] ... must be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny." (quoting 
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 51S U.S. 200, 227 (1995))) (emphasis added). 
157. See Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 14 (1988) (quoting New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 
297, 303 (1976)) (discussing the deferential, or rational basis, standard of review for non-suspect 
classifications). 
158. Diffenderfer, 587 F. Supp. 2d at 346. 
159. See Clingman v. Beaver, 544 U.S. 581, 592 (2005) ("Instead, as our cases since Tashjian have 
clarified, strict scrutiny is appropriate only if the burden is severe."). 
198 TEMPLE POLITICAL & CIVIL RIGHTS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 20:1 
voting rights, concluding that under those circumstances, the defendants need not 
prove intentional discrimination. 160 The court briefly discussed the history of anti-
American sentiment on the island, and explained that the "use of English is 
frequently identified with natives of the continental United States, as a distinct 
national category apart from native-born Puerto Ricans .... " 161 The court then 
drew the conclusion that, "in the context of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, 
membership in a linguistic group is essentially identical to a national, ethnic, or 
even racial classification," making strict scrutiny appropriate. 162 There is little 
precedent for this pronouncement. Stating that the defendants had not put forth any 
compelling interests to justify the existing ballot system, the court held that 
Spanish-only elections did not withstand strict scrutiny. 163 
The court also determined that Spanish-only ballots would not survive the 
highly deferential rational basis test because the defendants justified the Spanish-
only ballots based on the impracticality and high cost of creating new ones within 
the tight deadline before the election. 164 The court rejected this argument, based on 
testimony from the printer contracted to make the ballots that he could in fact create 
bilingual ballots in time. 165 Even if the paper stock that was ordinarily used was 
unavailable, the court saw no reason that the printer could not obtain other suitable 
stock. 166 
Finally, the court analyzed the Spanish-only ballots under the First 
Amendment. Describing the complexity of the ballot instructions, the court 
declared that "[r]equiring non-Spanish speakers to navigate these ballots entirely in 
Spanish effectively limits the political participation of a significant percentage of 
Puerto Rico's eligible voters." 167 The court also noted, however, that the ballots 
were likely to create confusion among Spanish speakers as well, as demonstrated 
by a heated dispute over contested ballots in the 2004 election. 168 Relying on the 
First Circuit's holding that "federal intervention into a state election was 
appropriate where a significant percentage of the qualified and voting electorate 
was, in effect, denied its vote," the court implied that the defendants had substantial 
First Amendment interests at stake by summarizing the many different methods of 
marking the ballot and the many different sets of instructions for voting for each 
office. 169 The court again examined the ·defendants' proffered reasons for the 
Spanish-only ballot, increased costs and the difficulty of meeting the printing 
deadline before the election. 170 Dismissing these logistical reasons for the second 
160. Diffenderfer, 587 F. Supp. 2d at 346 (citing Coalition for Educ. v. Bd. ofElections, 370 F. Supp. 
42, 55 (S.D.N.Y. 1974)). 
161. Id. at 347. 
I62. Id. 
163. See id. ('The Spanish-only ballot system clearly does not withstand strict scrutiny. Defendants 
have proposed no compelling interests which Spanish-only elections serve to protect."). 
164. Id. at 347-48. 
165. Id. at 348. 
166. Diffenderfer, 587 F. Supp. 2d at 348. 
167. Id. at 350. 
168. Id. at 349 n.10 (citing Rossell6-Gonz3lez v. Calder6n-Serra, 398 F.3d 1, 4-7 (!st Cir. 2004)). 
169. Id. at 349 (quoting Calderon-Se"a, 398 F.3d at 16); id. at 349-50. 
170. Id. at 350. 
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time, the court held that "[t]he increase in cost alone does not justify a substantial 
burden on Plaintiffs' First Amendment right to express themselves by voting" and 
declared the Spanish-only ballots unconstitutional. 171 
The election commission complied with the injunction by printing bilingual 
ballots, 172 and in April 2009 the district court ordered the defendants to pay the 
plaintiffs' attorneys' fees. 173 The defendants appealed both the underlying decision 
and the award of attorneys' fees. 174 While the appeal was pending, Puerto Rico 
enacted Law No. 90, mandating the use of bilingual ballots in all future Puerto 
Rican elections, Law No. 90 rendering the appeal on the merits moot. 175 
The First Circuit vacated the district court's opinion "because it was rendered 
moot by an independent, intervening act of legislation." 176 It also ruled that, 
because the plaintiffs successfully obtained the relief they sought in the district 
court, they remained prevailing parties for purposes of attorneys' fees, 177 and 
affirmed the fees award without examining the merits of the case. 178 
The timing of the passage of Law No. 90 and the First Circuit's subsequent 
ruling likely afforded the plaintiffs a windfall. Although the district court's decision 
was fair, the court lacked the authority to reach its result under the statutes and 
constitutional principles it invoked. It is therefore highly unlikely that the opinion 
would have survived First Circuit review on the merits. As the court acknowledged, 
the VRA does not cover individuals in the plaintiffs' unique position. 179 
Specifically, the court stated that Puerto Rico is not a covered jurisdiction under 
section four of the Act, which forbids certain jurisdictions from denying any citizen 
the right to vote based on any test or device, including language-based 
instruments. 180 It further noted that section two is equally unavailing because the 
Act does not include English speakers in its definition of a language minority. 181 
The VRA could therefore not support an order to print bilingual ballots. 
In its Equal Protection analysis, Diffenderfer cited only one case to support its 
proposition that "in the context of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, membership 
in a linguistic group is essentially identical to a national, ethnic, or even racial 
classification" and that, therefore, it was appropriate to apply strict scrutiny to the 
election commission's refusal to print bilingual ballots. 182 Without precedent to 
171. Diffenderfer, 587 F.Supp. 2d at 350. 
172. Diffenderfer v. G6mez-Col6n, 587 F.3d 445, 450 (1st Cir. 2009). 
173. Diffenderfer v. G6mez-Col6n, 606 F. Supp. 2d 222, 230 (D.P.R. 2009). 
174. Diffenderfer, 587 F.3d at 449. 
175. Id. 
176. Id. at 451. 
177. See id. at 454 ("They not only obtained the injunctive relief they sought. They also obtained the 
desired practical outcome of their suit through the operation of that injunction: the Commission in fact 
distributed bilingual ballots in the November 2008 elections." (footnote omitted)). 
178. See id. ("We recognize that the defendant did not have the chance to seek to reverse the court's 
injunction on appeal on the ground that it was based on an error oflaw."). 
179. Diffenderfer, 587 F. Supp. 2d at 345. 
180. Id. at 344. 
181. Id. 
182. Id. at 34 7. But see id. ("In Puerto Rico, use of English is frequently identified with natives of the 
continental United States, as a distinct national category apart from native-born Puerto Ricans, for whom 
Spanish remains their mother tongue."); id. ("Because the policy burdens the rights of monolingual 
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establish the application of strict scrutiny under these circumstances, only the 
court's rational basis review was proper. 183 Under rational basis review, the 
commission's decision was valid unless it bore no rational relationship to its 
legitimate interests. 184 One of the proffered reasons for the commission's decision, 
heightened costs, rationally relates to its interest in conducting elections at the least 
possible expense, and would therefore likely survive rational basis review upon 
appeal. 
Finally, the court's First Amendment analysis relied on the fact that the Puerto 
Rican election ballot "is complex and difficult to understand." 185 The court 
described four methods of voting (straight, mixed, candidate, and write-in), and 
three different types of ballots (governor and resident commissioner, state 
legislature, and municipal legislature), each of which comes with a different set of 
instructions. 186 The result of this elaborate voting scheme, the court concluded, was 
that "requiring non-Spanish speakers to navigate these ballots entirely in Spanish 
effectively limits the political participation of a significant percentage" of Puerto 
Rican voters. 187 The fact that the ballots presented equivalent obstacles to 
communicating Spanish voters' intentions, however, weakens the court's language-
based arguments and suggests that a challenge to the overall presentation of the 
ballots, in a different context, would be a more appropriate method to resolve this 
particular problem. 
The merits of the Diffenderfer plaintiffs' claims and the court's opinion are 
moot, but the legal contortions in which the court engaged to reach its desired result 
leave a lasting impression. The necessity of rewriting a statute and creating a new 
Equal Protection category stems from the same problem identified in the fair cross 
section analysis above. The proper application of constitutional and federal law in 
Puerto Rico does not lead to equitable outcomes. 
CONCLUSION 
Language is at the heart of the debate concerning Puerto Rico's relationship 
with the United States. 188 Faced with the choice between giving Puerto Rico 
English speakers to vote on the basis of their nationality and/or race, strict scrutiny is appropriate." 
(citing Coal.for Educ., 370 F. Supp. at 55)). 
183. The Supreme Court has stated that "[i]t may well be, for certain ethnic groups and in some 
communities, that proficiency in a particular language, like skin color, should be treated as a surrogate 
for race under an equal protection analysis." Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 371 (1991) 
(plurality opinion). The First Circuit may have held that this was one of those cases. 
184. See N.Y.C. Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 592 n.39 (1979) ("[L]egislative 
classifications are valid unless they bear no rational relationship to the State's objectives. State 
legislation 'does not violate the Equal Protection Clause merely because the classifications [it makes] 
are imperfect."' (quoting Wash. v. Yakima Indian Nation, 439 U.S. 463, 501-02 (1979)) (citations 
omitted)). 
185. Diffenderfer, 587 F. Supp. 2d at 349. 
186. Id. at 349-50. 
187. Id. at 350. 
188. For an excellent discussion of the effect of language issues on the relations between Puerto Rico 
and the United States, and the impact of language on Puerto Rico's possibility of attaining statehood, see 
generally Jose Julian Alvarez Gonzalez, law, language, and Statehood: The Role of English in the 
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independence and embracing it as a full state, the American government has 
adopted a third option-a Commonwealth status that likely no one envisioned 
would last over a hundred years. 189 A 1998 referendum conducted on the island 
determined Puerto Ricans' position regarding their relationship with the United 
States. When faced with a choice between statehood and independence, 50.3% of 
the voters selected "none of the above," 46.5% voted for statehood, and 2.5% voted 
for independence. 190 In similar referenda conducted in 1967 and 1993, Puerto 
Ricans chose the option to retain their current political status over both statehood 
and independence. 191 In 2009, Puerto Ricans elected as governor Luis G. Fortufio, 
Acevedo Vila's rival. 192 The election of a pro-statehood governor was accompanied 
by a push for a new referendum, one that some believe might finally result in a 
majority vote for statehood. 193 These referenda, however, are non-binding, and any 
future change to Puerto Rico's status will require Congressional approval. 194 
The imposition of English as the official language on this Spanish-speaking 
island that would almost certainly accompany a transition from Commonwealth to 
state would wreak havoc on all of Puerto Rico's institutions and present a logistical 
nightmare. The alternative, allowing a state to function in a language other than 
English, would pose another substantial set of challenges. Both the present situation 
and possible statehood thus relegate the island to a status of linguistic colonialism, 
a problem to which no solution, save independence, presents itself. Any other 
option deprives Puerto Ricans of either their language and culture, or certain 
fundamental constitutional and statutory rights. 195 
There are myriad and complex explanations for the United States' reluctance 
to relinquish its ownership of Puerto Rico. These include a desire to control the 
Great State of Puerto Rico, 17 LAW & INEQ. 359 ( 1999), 
189. Cf ALEXANDER 0DISHELIDZE & ARTHUR LAFFER, PAY TO THE ORDER OF PUERTO RICO 60 
(2004) ("Puerto Rico is neither a nation nor a state. It occupies a shadow-land, a kind of Limbo, where 
each and every aspect of its affairs, from law enforcement, to banking, to citizenship, to federal program 
eligibility, to taxation, is handled in a way peculiar to the island and its unique history."). 
190. Jose Trias Monge, Plenary Power and the Principle of Liberty: An Alternative View of the 
Political Condition of Puerto Rico, 68 REV. JUR. U.P.R. I, 19 (1999). 
191. Dwyer Arce, U.S. House Approves Puerto Rico Status Referendum Bill, JURIST (Apr. 30, 20 I 0), 
http:/ !jurist.law. pi tt. edu/paperchase/20 I 0/04/us-house-approves-bill-on-puerto-rico. php (last visited 
Nov. 12, 2010). 
192. Damien Cave, Puerto Rico Governor Promises Changes, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28, 2008, at A28. 
Acevedo Vila was acquitted of all the charges against him in March 2009, after he lost the election for 
governor to Fortuiio. Damien Cave & Omaya Sosa-Pascual, Puerto Rico Ex-Governor is Acquitted of 
Graft, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 2009, at Al3 
193. See Arce, supra note 191 ("(A bill passed by the U.S. House of Representatives in April 2010] 
would establish a two-step referendum, the first of which would ask voters in Puerto Rico whether they 
wanted to change the status of the island. If the option to change the island's status won, a second 
referendum would be held, giving voters the option of statehood, independence, 'sovereignty in 
association with the United States,' or maintaining the present status. Puerto Rican Governor Luis 
Fortuiio (R), along with the leaders of the territorial legislature, have expressed their support for the bill 
and eventual statehood."). 
194. Id. 
195. Cf Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, Bringing Democracy to Puerto Rico: A Rejoinder, 11 HARV. LATINO 
L. REV. 157, 160-63 (2008) (summarizing and criticizing arguments in favor of granting Puerto Rico 
representation in Congress without necessarily becoming a state). 
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island's resources and to maintain a supply of fresh military personnel to fight in its 
overseas wars, and the tax breaks enjoyed by the major American pharmaceutical 
companies on the island. 196 Puerto Ricans, in tum, have ample reasons to desire a 
strong connection to the United States, including annual injections of federal funds 
and massive job creation by the federal govemment. 197 Puerto Ricans must weigh 
these benefits with the potential loss of their linguistic and cultural identity, while 
the United States grapples with possible challenges to its language laws if a change 
in Puerto Rico's status results in mass migration or immigration to the mainland. 
These issues do not lend themselves to easy resolution. But it is clear that 
Puerto Ricans should not have to struggle for basic legal rights such as a jury drawn 
from a fair cross section of the community and the ability to communicate in their 
own language in their courts. To this end, while the question of Puerto Rico's status 
remains pending, the United States should implement changes in the law that would 
lead to a more equitable system. 198 
To ensure that the District of Puerto Rico complies with the Sixth Amendment 
and its statutory equivalent, Congress should amend the Jury Service and Selection 
Act to exempt Puerto Rico from the English-language requirement for federal 
jurors. Puerto Rico's district courts should function bilingually, with federal 
provision of interpretation into either Spanish or English for all parties, witnesses, 
attorneys, court reporters, clerks, judges, and observers. The transition to a 
bilingual court would be relatively simple due to the fact that the infrastructure for 
interpretation is already in place. To facilitate proceedings in Spanish, the court 
would, in most cases, need only to interpret the record from Spanish to English for 
the First Circuit's use on appeal. To continue the existing proceedings in English 
but allow monolingual Spanish speakers to serve as jurors, the court could provide 
interpretation to jurors through the same mechanism currently in place to translate 
the testimony of Spanish-speaking witnesses and give Spanish-speaking defendants 
and parties simultaneous translation. 
This is not an entirely radical proposition, as a United States court currently 
operates bilingually. New Mexico state courts provide translation for Spanish jurors 
to ensure that all members of the community may serve on a jury. 199Their system 
196. See ODISHELIDZE, supra note 189, at 61 ("[I]ndustries on the island, particularly U.S. 
pharmaceutical companies, have enjoyed a targeted tax break that essentially relieved them of all U.S. 
corporate income tax on their earnings there."); DICK THORNBURGH, PUERTO RICO'S FUTURE: A TIME 
TO DECIDE 6 (2007) (stating that Puerto Rico bears special military significance for the United States, 
being its southernmost military "stronghold" and ranking "alongside the top five U.S. states in per capita 
military service."); cf Ediberto Roman, Empire Forgotten: The United States's Colonization of Puerto 
Rico, 42 VILL. L. REV. I I 19, 1150 n.139 (1997) ("The United States acquired direct control over Puerto 
Rico to 'provide uninhibited access to its territory, its resources and even its people for military 
purposes."' (quoting Efren Rivera Ramos, The Legal Construction of American Colonialism: The 
Insular Cases (1901-1922), 65 REV. JUR. U. P.R. 225, 316 (1996))). 
I 97. See ODISHELIDZE, supra note 189, at 59-75 (providing figures and statistics on U.S. spending on 
Puerto Rico in various fields, including housing, nutrition assistance, education, transportation and 
vocational training). 
I 98. For a thorough discussion of recommendations to convert the District of Puerto Rico into a fully 
bilingual court, see Gonzales Rose, supra note 22. 
199. Id. 
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works well and has not generated complaints of inaccuracy or inefficiency. 200 
Additionally, federal courts have long allowed translation for deafjurors. 201 
Another potential benefit of a bilingual court would be that greater 
participation in the federal judiciary would increase Puerto Ricans' investment in 
the system and reduce hostility that has historically manifested itself in violent 
protests and other forms of resistance, including the attempted shooting of First 
Circuit Judge Juan Torruella. 202 Some Puerto Ricans already recognize certain 
advantages to the presence of the federal court, such as a plethora of high-paid jobs 
and the ability to shift the burden of prosecuting drug crimes from the 
Commonwealth courts. To others, the federal court represents the most oppressive 
aspect of Puerto Rico's colonial status because the court has the unchecked power 
to impose lengthy sentences that defendants must serve in federal prisons. The 
United States' attempt to seek the death penalty against some defendants has been a 
source of continuous controversy, as it flies in the face of Puerto Rico's clear 
constitutional mandate that "the death penalty should not exist."203 
In addition to amending the Jury Service and Selection Act to allow for 
bilingual federal courts on the island, Congress should incorporate protections for 
minority English speakers into the Voting Rights Act and amend Title VII to 
protect individuals in Puerto Rico from discrimination based on language. 204 For its 
part, when faced with future constitutional and statutory challenges, the federal 
judiciary should strive, with flexibility and creativity, to balance national interests 
with Puerto Rican rights without sacrificing either, even if the result is a different 
rule for the Commonwealth than the one applicable to the incorporated states. To 
maintain the integrity of American law and the dignity of Puerto Rico's citizens, 
the United States should act swiftly and decisively to conform federal law to the 
realities of Puerto Rico and end linguistic colonialism. 
200. Id. 
201. Id. 
202. See e.g., Thousands Mark lsland"s Status as Commonwealth, ORLANDO SENTINEL, July 26, 
2006, at A6 (reporting that on the fifty-fourth anniversary of Puerto Rico's status as a U.S. 
Commonwealth, supporters of Puerto Rico's independence gathered with pro-independence speeches, 
protests, and egg-throwing); 5 Women Sentenced in Vieques Bombing Protest, HOUS. CHRON., Apr. 11, 
2002, at Al8 (reporting that members of Puerto Rico's pro-independence party did not defend federal 
trespassing charges brought against them because they do not recognize U.S. federal court authority in 
Puerto Rico). 
203. See Adam Liptak, Puerto Ricans Angry That U.S. Overrode Death Penalty Ban, N.Y. TIMES, 
July 17, 2003, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2003/07 /17 /us/puerto-ricans-angry-that-us-
overrode-death-penalty-ban.html. 
204. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (prohibiting employment discrimination only on account of 
"race, color, religion, sex, or national origin"), with 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(f)(2) ("No voting qualification or 
prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or 
political subdivision to deny or abridge the right of any citizen of the United States to vote because he is 
a member of a language minority group."). Puerto Rico is not a covered jurisdiction under section four 
of the VRA. Diffenderfer, 587 F. Supp. 2d at 344. Lengthier discussion of these proposals is beyond the 
scope of this essay, but it is the author's hope that others will formulate precise amendments and 
advocate for their implementation. 
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